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FROM “HE SAID, SHE SAID” TO “HE SAID, SHE-AND-HERIPHONE-SAID”: FLORIDA’S ALL-PARTY CONSENT
REQUIREMENT NEEDS AN UPDATE
Sarah Morgado
ABSTRACT
Wiretap laws have an important place in protecting privacy interests by
preventing eavesdropping, but some states have taken privacy protections too
far. Florida stands with a minority of states that impose a harsh “all-party
consent” requirement, only permitting secret recording of a private
conversation where all parties to a communication consent. The majority of
states only impose a “single-party consent” requirement, which allows a
person to secretly record any conversation he or she is a party to. Under the
Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of Florida’s wiretap law, application
of the stringent all-party consent requirement harms victims of crime, results
in the suppression of highly probative evidence, hampers social exchange,
and prevents the public from exposing private and state misconduct. In
comparison, single-party consent serves valid privacy interests but
recognizes the benefits that secret recording can provide to society. This
article explores why Florida needs to change its wiretap statute to singleparty consent.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Anna and Jonathan are in a serious relationship and have been dating
for six months. Everything was great. But then Jonathan lost his job, and the
relationship began to unravel. Jonathan began acting erratic, resentful, and
controlling. He demanded Anna share her location with him on her
smartphone. He drove by the restaurant she worked at to “check in” on her.
When her shifts ran late, he accused her of sleeping with other men for
money. He slapped her in the face when she stood up to him but then
immediately begged for forgiveness and promised, fervently, that it would
never happen again. A week later, in another confrontation, he wrapped his
hand around her throat. Anna knew then that she needed help. With no idea
what to do or where to turn, she sought out the Internet for advice. There, she
found websites urging her to document the abuse for legal purposes, so she
downloaded an application on her phone to record their next conversation,
where she planned to confront him about the abuse and catch an admission.
Ivan works as a ridesharing1 driver, where he often deals with
intoxicated and belligerent passengers. Passengers had gone so far as to
urinate in his car, steal his cash tips, and break parts inside his vehicle.
Fortunately, the ridesharing companies permit reporting of such instances
and will charge a fee to the offending customer and reimburse the driver. But
where customers deny the occurrence and the driver possesses no
documentation, refunds are not guaranteed. Ivan has paid for detail cleaning
and repairs from his own pocket more than once. As a solution, he installed
a hidden camera, with audio and video capabilities, inside his vehicle, with
the intention to document any future incidents.
The instant that Anna and Ivan capture a conversation on their recording
devices, they each have likely committed a felony under Florida’s wiretap
law, which bars a person from secretly recording a private conversation

1 Syed I. Ajmal, The Ultimate Guide to Ridesharing: How it Works and What the Future Holds,
RIDESTER, https://www.ridester.com/ridesharing-guide/ (last updated Nov. 8, 2018).

12 - MORGADO (DO NOT DELETE )

2/25/2021 3:14 PM

2021] From “He Said, She Said” to “He Said, She-and-Her-iPhone-Said”

679

unless all parties to the conversation consent—often called an “all-party
consent requirement.” This minority rule creates unreasonable and unjust
outcomes. The all-party consent requirement is unreasonable because it
defies a basic premise of privacy: when a person conveys information to
someone else, they assume the risk that the recipient may be untrustworthy
and could share the information. No law would ban a person from
immediately writing down something someone told them, but yet recording
the same is illegal. The all-party consent requirement also results in injustice.
It prevents victims of crime from documenting evidence of criminal activity.
And if they violate the law, in a twisted turn of events, they are subject to
criminal prosecution and can even be sued by the person whose “privacy”
they violated. Further, the consent requirement harms the truth -finding
process in courts by suppressing reliable evidence. It hampers technology use
by exposing violators to criminal and civil liability for using widely
accessible and commonly used technology. And finally, it prevents citizens
from employing technology to expose private and public misconduct. All this
is in the name of a privacy interest in information a person already freely
communicated to another. Florida should instead adopt the majority rule of
single-party consent, which permits a person to record a conversation he or
she is a party to—a rule that benefits justice and society, and also aligns with
basic social norms.
In Section II, this comment will explore the background of wiretap law,
including its history and purpose. In Section III, this comment will explain
the pros and cons of an all-party consent requirement. Finally, in Section IV,
this comment will discuss Florida’s wiretap law and examine the important
concerns implicated by an all-party consent requirement.
II. BACKGROUND
Wiretapping is a form of surveillance, defined as “electronic or
mechanical eavesdropping.”2 Quintessential wiretapping takes the form of
listening to a telephone conversation, 3 but the modern definition more
broadly includes even electronic surveillance of in-person conversations. 4
Traditionally used in police investigations, wiretaps are an important part of
the police investigative process, especially when investigating large-scale

2

Wiretapping, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).

Christopher Woolf, The History of Electronic Surveillance, from Abraham Lincoln ’s Wiretaps
to Operation Shamrock, PUB. RADIO I NT’L (Nov. 17, 2013, 9:30 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2013 11-07/history-electronic-surveillance-abraham-lincolns-wiretaps-operation-shamrock/.
3

4

See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2018).
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criminal operations. 5 To understand state wiretap laws—and consequently,
the problems with Florida’s wiretap law—it is necessary to understand the
purpose and history of the federal wiretap laws.
A. History of Wiretap Legislation
Federal wiretap legislation evolved as a response to rampant warrantless
police wiretapping. During Prohibition, the rise in organized crime prompted
increased police wiretap use. 6 In response to the privacy concerns provoked
by warrantless wiretapping—police officers listening in on private
conversations—Congress enacted the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 7
which imposed evidentiary limits on evidence resulting from a warrantless
wiretap. 8
Thirty years later, however, Katz v. United States shifted Fourth
Amendment search jurisprudence, and the Court held that warrantless police
interception of private communications constituted a Fourth Amendment
“search,” provided that the speaker exhibited a “reasonable expectation of
privacy.”9
In response to Katz, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, an overhaul of wiretap laws that
comprehensively regulated all electronic surveillance of conversations.10
Title III increased communication protections and imposed a warrant
requirement on all wiretaps. 11 Most importantly, Title III barred intentional
interceptions of oral or telephone communications by any person, not just

5 See generally Hugh Scott, Wiretapping and Organized Crime, 14 H OW. L.J. 1 (1968); see also
Jordan Maglich, Once Reserved for Drug Crimes, Wiretapping Takes Center Stage in White Collar
Prosecutions,
FORBES
(May
21,
2019,
11:32
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jordanmaglich/2013/05/21/once-reserved-for-drug-crimes-wiretappingtakes-center-stage-in-white-collar-prosecutions/#1bc1f6119691.
6 See Karen Abbott, The Bootlegger, the Wiretap, and the Beginning of Privacy, NEW YORKER
(July 5, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-bootlegger-the-wiretap-and-thebeginning-of-privacy; see also Alex Gauthier, History of Wiretapping: from Prohibition to Patriot Act,
I NDEP. VOTER NETWORK (June 21, 2013), https://ivn.us/2013/06/21/the-history-of-wiretapping-fromprohibition-to-the-patriot-act/. See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
7 See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)).
8

Id.

9

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 358 (1967); see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
63 (1967).
10 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90 -351, 82 Stat. 197
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994)).
11

Id.; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
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police but private individuals—an unprecedented step in federal wiretap
legislation. 12
Rapid technological advancements soon rendered Title III “hopelessly
out of date.”13 Congress amended it with the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act. Its predecessor only covered oral or telephone communications,
and with a rise in e-mail, cell phone, cordless phone, pager, and video
conference use, Title III’s scope no longer furthered its purpose. 14 Title III’s
amended version now covers all wire, oral, or electronic communication.15
1. Title III
a. Important Title III Provisions
Two parts of Title III are important to understand: the bar against
wiretapping and the single-party consent exception. First, Title III generally
bars the intentional interception of communications:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter
any person who—
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or
procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to
intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication;
. . . .16
This definition requires unpacking. “Intercept” means “the aural or other
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication
through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” 17 “Aural”
means “of or relating to the ear or to the sense of hearing.” 18 Put simply, there
must be an audio component to the communication—silent video does not
fall under the purview of Title III. 19 “Wire communication” covers
12

See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.

13

S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2 (1986).

14

Id.

15 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22, 2701–11, 3121–26).
16

18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2018).

17

18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2002) (“‘intercept’ means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any
wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”).
18 Definition
of
Aural,
M ERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/aural?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld (last visited
Apr. 7, 2019).
19 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (“‘wire communication’ means any aural transfer made in whole or in part
through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like
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transmission through telephone lines or other similar connections, and
“electronic communication” broadly covers “any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence” transmitted through various
electronic processes. 20 “Oral communication” means a non-electronic oral
communication, uttered by a person exhibiting a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 21
Finally, the statute excepts the interception of communications where
one party to the conversation consents:
(d) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person
not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or
electronic communication where such person is a party to the
communication or where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception
. . . .22
The consenting party can be, and often is, the party who is intercepting
the conversation. For example, a person could secretly record a meeting they
were present at and not violate Title III. This exception greatly limits the
scope of Title III and makes Title III a “single-party consent” law. 23 In singleparty consent jurisdictions, prototypical eavesdropping is all that is
prohibited: listening in on a private conversation a person is not a party to
(think hiding a “bug” in someone’s home or a housekeeper tiptoeing up to
listen in on a private conversation in a bedroom). 24

connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in
a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities
for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or
foreign commerce; . . . .”); see also Smith v. Wunker, 356 F. Supp. 44, 46 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (citing to
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW I NTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1967)) (“The words ‘aural acquisition’ literally
translated mean to come into possession through the sense of hearing.”). See, e.g., id. (holding that
recording surveillance that uses the sense of sight rather than hearing to apprehend the contents of the
recording does not fall within the purview of Title III); United States v. Gregg, 829 F.2d 1430, 1434 (8th
Cir. 1987).
20 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (“‘electronic communication’ means any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system . . . .”).
21 Id. (“‘oral communication’ means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an
expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such
expectation, but such term does not include any electronic communication; . . . .”); see also infra Section
II.A.1.b.
22 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2018); see also United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 151 (1974) (noting Title
III is a balance between individual privacy concerns and the need to secure evidence of a violation of the
criminal laws).
23

See infra Section II.B.

24

See FLA. STAT. § 934.03 (2015).
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b. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The reasonable expectation of privacy requirement exacts another
important limit on the scope of Title III. 25 In Katz v. United States, the Court
held that a speaker exhibits a reasonable expectation of privacy if (1) the
speaker has an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the
communication, and (2) society is prepared to recognize that expectation as
reasonable. 26 Much of the Court’s reasonable expectation of privacy
jurisprudence arises, like Katz, in Fourth Amendment search cases. The Katz
definition, and later jurisprudence further interpreting it, has been
incorporated into Title III. 27
A person’s reasonable expectation of privacy is context-specific and
depends on the location of the conversation, its volume, and the parties
present, among other factors. 28 The fact-specific nature of the reasonable
expectation of privacy inquiry makes predictions about any given
circumstance difficult. It is clear, however, that pure eavesdropping into a
private conversation, by someone who is not a party to that communication
and where neither party has consented to the eavesdropping, infringes on a
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 29 The question is not so clear
when the communication takes place in a less “private” context, such as
where someone is in a group of people, at a meeting at work, or in an
automobile. 30
When one party to a conversation secretly records or later divulges the
information to law enforcement, the Court has held that a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy is not violated. 31 In that context, although a person
exhibits a subjective expectation that the information conveyed will be kept
private, that expectation is not reasonable. 32 The unreasonableness is based
on the premise that a speaker, when communicating information to another,

25

§ 2511.

26

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

27

See, e.g., United States v. McKinnon, 985 F.2d 525, 527–28 (11th Cir. 1993).

28 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405–13 (2012) (discussing several cases and their
various results when interpreting persons’ reasonable expectation of privacy).
29

See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.

30

Compare Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 91 (1990) (holding an overnight guest held a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his host’s home), with Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 83–84 (1998)
(holding that guests at a home that were only present for commercial transactions could not hold a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the host’s home).
31 See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966) (“The risk of being . . . betrayed by
an informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is probably inherent in the conditions
of human society. It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak.”) (quoting Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963)).
32

Id.
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always assumes the risk that the person they are confiding in will not keep
the communicated information private. 33 This theory is called the “falsefriend doctrine.”34
Thus, an undercover police officer could record a conversation without
a warrant,35 and so could a government informant, 36 even in a person’s private
home, 37 as long as he or she is actually part of the conversation. The singleparty consent exception in Title III acknowledges the false-friend doctrine’s
premise by permitting a person to record a conversation he or she is a party
to. 38
B. State Wiretap Laws
Congress intended Title III to provide a floor for privacy protections
with regard to electronic surveillance, but Title III does not preempt more
restrictive state wiretap provisions.39
Most states either adopted the federal statute into their state codes or
modified the statute only slightly to serve certain state interests. 40 At the time
of this comment, fifteen states provided more rigorous privacy protections
than Title III. 41
All states have consent exceptions. These exceptions can fall into any
of four categories: (1) pure single-party consent; (2) default single-party
consent; (3) pure all-party consent; and (4) default all-party consent. 42 States
that are pure single-party consent track the federal statute’s consent
exception: the statute is not implicated provided one party to the
communication consents.
But the more restrictive states impose more rigorous consent exceptions,
some type of all-party consent requirement. Instead of requiring only one
party to consent before intercepting a communication, those states require all
33

Id.; On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751–52 (1952).

Donald L. Doernberg, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Expectations of Privacy, False Friends, and
the Perils of Speaking Under the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 39 I ND. L. REV.
253, 275 (2006).
34

35

Lopez, 373 U.S. at 437–39.

36

On Lee, 343 U.S. at 754.

37

Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749

(1971).
38

See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2018).

39

See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 1976).

40 Carol M. Bast, What’s Bugging You? Inconsistencies and Irrationalities of the Law of
Eavesdropping, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 837, 851 (1998).
41 Michael D. White & Henry F. Fradella, The Intersection of Law, Policy, and Police Body-Worn
Cameras: An Exploration of Critical Issues, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1579, 1608 (2018).
42

Id. at 1607–611.
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parties to consent before interception, unless the speakers do not exhibit a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
Consider two examples emphasizing the effect of the reasonable
expectation of privacy interaction with all-party consent requirements. A and
B are having coffee together in A’s kitchen, discussing A’s divorce. B
surreptitiously records the conversation. In an all-party consent jurisdiction,
B has committed a violation because A exhibits a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a private conversation taking place in her own kitchen. In contrast,
if A and B are having the same conversation in a busy coffee shop, where
anyone could hear it, and B surreptitiously records the conversation, an allparty consent jurisdiction would not bar this action because A does not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a public communication, where
anyone could hear it. Thus, the communication falls outside the scope of most
statutes. 43
States in the second category, default single-party consent jurisdictions,
generally permit single-party consent but also provide exceptions to that rule
for specific types of communications. Those exceptions require all-party
consent only in certain situations. For instance, some states impose all-party
consent requirements only when intercepting telephone conversations. 44
States that fall into the third category, pure all-party consent jurisdictions,
always require all parties to a conversation to consent before the
communication can be recorded; that is, unless the speakers do not exhibit a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Finally, some states are default all-party
consent but have crafted exceptions where single-party consent is permitted.
For example, some states permit only one party to consent where they are in
fear of harm. All-party consent jurisdictions—including Florida—are the
subject of criticism. 45
C. Florida’s Wiretap Law
Florida’s wiretap law closely tracks the federal statute.46 Florida is a
default all-party consent jurisdiction with very limited exceptions to its
consent requirement. 47 Florida incorporates the same definitions and
43 See McDonough v. Fernandez-Rundle, 862 F.3d 1314, 1321 (11th Cir. 2017). But see M ASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2020).
44 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-570d(a) (West 2019) (permitting one-party consent
for in-person conversations but requiring all-party consent for recording telephone conversations).
45 Rauvin Johl, Reassessing Wiretap and Eavesdropping Statutes: Making One-Party Consent the
Default, 12 H ARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 177, 184 (2018); David K. Warren, A Man’s Home Is His Castle, but
It Has a Secret Dungeon: Domestic Violence Victims Need an Amendment to Florida ’s All-Party Consent
Law, 69 FLA. L. REV. 223, 226–27 (2017).
46

FLA. STAT. § 934.03 (2020).

47

Id.
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reasonable expectation of privacy requirement as Title III, including the Katz
standard. 48 Florida’s all-party consent exception reads:
(d) It is lawful under this section . . . for a person to intercept
a wire, oral, or electronic communication when all of the
parties to the communication have given prior consent to
such interception. 49
This one-word deviation from Title III places Florida among the
minority jurisdictions that chose to heavily restrict the interception of
communications.
Florida’s remedies for a violation of the statute are similar to those in
the federal system. 50 A violation of the statute is a felony in the third-degree,51
a violating party is open to civil suit by the person whose communication was
intercepted (damages are case-specific),52 and any evidence obtained in
violation of the statute is inadmissible in court proceedings. 53
III. PROS AND CONS OF CONSENT EXCEPTION-TYPES
The pros and cons of the different exception-types are often two sides
of the same coin. The question, as with all legislation, is which countervailing
interest is more important. Most all-party consent states have not provided
rationales for their decision to impose the burdensome restriction. But those
that have justified their determination to impose all-party consent
requirements voiced concern with stunting social exchange and interest in
promoting general privacy protections. 54 Pennsylvania, for example,
determined that the value of encouraging social exchange, free from worry
about eavesdropping, outweighed the beneficial interests served by
permitting eavesdropping. 55 Massachusetts, in changing from a one-party
consent scheme to an all-party consent scheme, noted that “the uncontrolled
development and unrestricted use of modern electronic surveillance devices
pose[d] grave dangers to the privacy of all citizens of the commonwealth.” 56
48 See State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272, 1277 (Fla. 1985); see also Smith v. State, 261 So. 3d
714 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018); McDade v. State, 154 So. 3d 292, 299 (Fla. 2014).
49

§ 934.03(2)(d) (emphasis added).

50

§ 934.03.

51

§ 934.03(4)(a).

52

§ 934.10.

53

§ 934.06.

54

Alan F. Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970’s: Part II:
Balancing the Conflicting Demands of Privacy, Disclosure, and Surveillance, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1205,
1205 (1966).
55

Commonwealth v. Papszycki, 275 A.2d 28, 30–31 (Pa. 1971).

56

Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 967 (Mass. 2001).
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The common thread between state rationales is a concern with hampering
social exchange and general privacy interests. 57
Like all-party consent schemes, single-party consent schemes are also
not always justified by the legislature. Even without explicit justification,
however, single-party consent jurisdictions determined that increasingly
stringent privacy protections are unjustified in light of the important interests
that interceptions of communications can serve. 58
Moreover, basic social exchange norms align with single-party consent.
The false friend doctrine provides an excellent example of this. As
recognized by the Supreme Court, sharing information with others in the
form of conversation involves a certain level of risk. 59 Any person who
exposes information to another always assumes the risk that the person they
are conversing with is not trustworthy but instead is a false friend. 60 States
that choose to enact single-party consent schemes recognize that “false
friends” are not only commonplace in society but can benefit society. 61
Importantly, single-party consent does not implicate valid concerns
about eavesdropping that stem from bedrock principles of privacy. 62 Even in
single-party consent jurisdictions, listening in on private conversations
remains illegal. 63 Spying spouses may not record phone calls in a home. 64
Curious houseguests may not listen in on conversations. 65 Installation of
spying devices is still illegal. 66
This is not to say that there are no cons to single-party consent. A person
does give up limited privacy interests when in single-party consent
jurisdictions. Because someone can record a perfect replica of a conversation,
any he-said-she-said situations are minimized. 67 But even in all-party consent
jurisdictions, a person may typically share any information they are conveyed
by another. For example, if A tells B, “I hid the gun under my couch,” then
B can testify (within evidentiary parameters) to this conversation or tell
others about it; B just could not record the communication in an all-party
consent jurisdiction. So, the only real difference is in the quality of the
captured idea, not its substance. But single-party consent jurisdictions
57

Johl, supra note 45, at 177.

58

See United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 151 (1974).

59

Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966).

60

Id.

61

See infra Section IV.B.4.

62

Johl, supra note 45, at 182.

63

See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2018).

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

See infra Section IV.B.1.
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determined that that limited privacy interest is far outweighed by the many
benefits that intercepting communications provides.
One benefit of single-party consent is the introduction of reliable
evidence, aiding the court in the truth-finding process. 68 Subject to hearsay
rules, a person may testify to the contents of a conversation he or she is a
party to. 69 But a recording of a conversation, where a person can hear the
exact words a person uttered, with inflection, tone, and volume, is much more
reliable and compelling evidence. 70 A recording of a conversation is far more
reliable than the testimony and/or notes of a conversation participant. 71 Thus,
the effect of single-party consent is to promote the truth-finding process
generally and also encourage sound justice.
Single-party consent also serves societal goals, such as catching
workplace misconduct, bullying, or deception. Further, single-party consent
results in less inhibited social interaction. As technology develops, recording
device use increases, including devices that surreptitiously record. Singleparty consent permits people to employ new technology, technology that is
rapidly integrating with how humans interact. Thus, single-party consent
benefits social exchange.
IV. FLORIDA’S NEED FOR AN UPDATE TO SINGLE-PARTY
CONSENT
Although there are limited benefits to all-party consent, further
examination into real-world application of all-party consent statutes reveals
that they pose real, important problems. They harm more than they help.
Florida’s all-party consent requirement harms victims by exposing them to
criminal and civil liability. It harms the justice system by preventing the
introduction of reliable evidence. It harms social exchange by chilling
technology use. And it harms citizens by limiting private and public
accountability.
A.

Florida’s Take on the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

Although the Supreme Court has incorporated the false-friend theory
into its interpretation of the reasonable expectation of privacy, Florida has
not. Florida courts have, however, attempted to limit the definition of the
reasonable expectation of privacy as much as Chapter 934 permits.

68

See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963).

69

See id.

70

See id.

71

See id.
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Florida courts began chipping away at the breadth of the reasonable
expectation of privacy in State v. Inciarrano.72 There, the defendant went to
the victim’s office and murdered him by shooting him five times. 73 The
victim surreptitiously recorded the shooting and captured the defendant and
victim’s conversation regarding a business deal the victim wanted out of. 74
Then, the recording captured the sounds of a gun being cocked, five gunshots,
moaning, the victim falling to the floor, blood gushing, and after all fell silent,
footsteps and the sound of the defendant leaving. 75 Although the conversation
took place in a private place of business, during a private conversation, the
Florida Supreme Court surprisingly held that the conversation did not fall
within the purview of section 934.03, because the defendant lost his
reasonable expectation of privacy when he entered the victim’s office for the
purpose of inflicting harm on him. 76 When he entered the office not as a
patient, but as a trespassing wrongdoer, he lost all privacy interests, and any
later, surreptitiously recorded conversations were admissible against him. 77
The major takeaway from Inciarrano is that a person who trespasses has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversations. 78
Florida courts extended the principles of Inciarrano in Jatar v.
Lamaletto.79 There, Lamaletto feared his attorney, Jatar, would seek to extort
money from him. 80 Lamaletto secretly recorded a conversation with Jatar
when Jatar came to visit Lamaletto at Lamaletto’s office. 81 As Lamaletto
suspected, Jatar did seek to extort him, and the recording captured
incriminating statements.82 The Third District Court of Appeals held the
recording was not barred by Chapter 934 because of where it was conducted:
in the victim’s business office. 83 Because the recording was in a place of
business, the court held Jatar did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy, and, thus, the recording was not within the scope of Chapter 934. 84
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals followed Florida’s lead when it
was required to analyze Chapter 934. In McDonough v. Fernandez-Rundle,

72

See generally State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1985).

73

Id. at 1274.

74

See id.

75

Id.

76

Id. at 1276.

77

Id. at 1275–76.

78

Id.

79

See generally Jatar v. Lamaletto, 758 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).

80

Id. at 1168.

81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Id. at 1169.

84

Id.
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the Homestead Chief of Police invited McDonough to discuss a series of
complaints McDonough had lodged against a Homestead police officer. 85
McDonough secretly recorded the meeting with the Chief, which took place
in the Chief’s office with a friend of McDonough’s and a Homestead Police
Department Internal Affairs detective. 86 The Eleventh Circuit held the
conduct did not implicate section 934.03.87 The court reasoned that, based on
the number of participants in the meeting, the topic of discussion, and
because the Chief did not “exhibit”—that is, demonstrate externally—any
sort of expectation that the meeting was private or confidential, the officers
did not exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy in the recorded
communication. 88 Therefore, McDonough did not violate Chapter 934.
While Florida’s interpretations of the reasonable expectation of privacy
seem hopeful in ensuring justice is done, Florida courts draw the line at
communications in the home. McDade v. State emphasizes the major flaw in
Chapter 934, and the resulting effect it has on victims. 89 In McDade, the
defendant was accused of committing sexual battery upon a child under
twelve years of age. 90 The victim, stepdaughter to the defendant, reported the
abuse to her mother and to a doctor, but neither believed her. 91 After several
years of abuse, at the behest of the victim’s new boyfriend, the victim and
her boyfriend concocted a plan to catch her stepfather admitting to the sexual
abuse. 92 She used her boyfriend’s MP3 player, hidden under her shirt, and
recorded her stepfather making incriminating statements regarding the
abuse. 93 The evidence was admitted at trial, and the jury found the stepfather
guilty. 94 The Florida Supreme Court held that Chapter 934 barred admission
of the evidence. 95 The court noted that the situation presented compelling
reasons to justify the inclusion of the evidence and called for the legislature
to craft an exception to permit the admission of surreptitious recordings when
the purpose of the recording is to gather evidence of criminal activity. 96
After McDade, the stance of the Florida courts shows there can be no
reasonable expectation of privacy held by a trespasser, and likely not in a

85

McDonough v. Fernandez-Rundle, 862 F.3d 1314, 1316 (11th Cir. 2017).

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Id. at 1319.

89

See generally McDade v. State, 154 So. 3d 292 (Fla. 2014).

90

Id. at 294.

91

Id.

92

Id. at 295.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Id. at 300.

96

Id. at 299.
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place of business, but Chapter 934 bars any surreptitious recording within a
private residence without the consent of all parties. 97 The home is one place
where a person nearly always exhibits a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Although Florida courts succeeded in restricting the statute’s application to
achieve just outcomes, it is clear that a person exhibits a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their in-home communications. 98 As a result,
victims are left in a bind: the Florida legislature has deemed the privacy
interests of the home more important than a person’s ability to feel safe.
B.

The Harms of Florida’s All-Party Consent Requirement

Florida’s all-party consent requirement imposes burdens and restricts
benefits that flow from the use of surreptitious recordings. As explained in
this section, all-party consent burdens victims, harms the justice system,
stifles social exchange, impedes the use of modern technology, and pu nishes
those who seek to uncover misconduct.
1. Burdens on Victims
As emphasized by McDade, the most worrisome flaw with Chapter 934
is how it can be applied to victims of crime. If the recording happens in a
home, the evidence must be suppressed. And to add insult to injury, the
perpetrator of the crime can sue the victim. Moreover, the victim is also open
to criminal prosecution, all because of his or her effort to capture evidence of
a crime.
a. Domestic Violence Victims
Domestic violence victims are the most vulnerable subset of victims
under Chapter 934. To understand why, it is important to understand common
features of domestic violence situations. First, domestic violence commonly
results in a he-said-she-said scenario. 99 When this situation arises,
corroboration is necessary to proceed. Absent physical injury, corroboration
is much more difficult. 100 Sadly, severe, life-threatening acts—or even
death—are often necessary for prosecution to occur. 101 When these he-said97

See id. at 297–98.

98

Id. at 296.

99 Carolyn Copps Hartley, “He Said, She Said”: The Defense Attack of Credibility in Domestic
Violence Felony Trials, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 510, 514 (2001).
100

Id. at 514.

101

Katie Zezima , Deanna Paul, Steven Rich, Julie Tate & Jennifer Jenkins, Domestic Slayings:
and
Foreseeable,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
9,
2018),

Brutal
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she-said situations present themselves, a video or audio recording of either
the abuse or an admission of abuse would quickly aid law enforcement in
deciding whether and who to arrest. 102 In fact, victims of abuse are regularly
encouraged to document their abuse for legal purposes. 103 The second feature
of domestic violence is that it is inherently domestic; it occurs most
commonly in the home—in private. 104 Application of all-party consent
requirements results in a victim who is unable to corroborate abuse because
it takes place where the abuser exhibits a reasonable expectation of privacy,
implicating Chapter 934. 105
Florida’s legislature did not turn a deaf ear to the Florida Supreme
Court’s pleading in McDade; the legislature is not ignorant to the harm that
all-party consent imposes on victims. Noting the importance of the problem
encountered in McDade, the Legislature responded with an amendment to
Chapter 934, implementing a new, narrow exception:
It is lawful under this section and ss. 934.04–934.09 for a
child under 18 years of age to intercept and record an oral
communication if the child is a party to the communication
and has reasonable grounds to believe that recording the
communication will capture a statement by another party to
the communication that the other party intends to commit, is
committing, or has committed an unlawful sexual act or an
unlawful act of physical force or violence against the
child. 106
McDade was an unjust and illogical result. The McDade court
recognized the need for reliable evidence of crimes. 107 The statute places
privacy interests in the home over victims’ interest in achieving justice. 108
The aforementioned amendment attempts to resolve these concerns, giving a

https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/investigations/domestic-violencemurders/?utm_term=.67b37369c62e.
102 Building Your Case: How to Document Abuse, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE H OTLINE (May
12,
2014),
https://www.thehotline.org/2014/05/12/building-your-case-how-to-document-abuse/
(encouraging victims to safely save digital evidence of abuse).
103 Id.; Smartphone Apps that Help You Document Abuse, DOMESTICSHELTERS.ORG (Aug. 15,
2016), https://www.domesticshelters.org/domestic-violence-articles-information/smartphone-apps-thathelp-you-document-abuse/ (encouraging use of smartphone applications that record audio and video); 5
Important Ways to Document Abuse, BREAK THE CYCLE: DATING VIOLENCE BLOG,
https://www.breakthecycle.org/blog/5-important-ways-document-abuse (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).
104

See McDade v. State, 154 So. 3d 292, 294 (Fla. 2014).

105

Id. at 296–97.

106

FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(k) (2019).

107

See McDade, 154 So. 3d at 299.

108

See id.
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single-party consent exception to children for the purpose of substantiating
abuse allegations. 109
The Legislature did not go far enough. One-party consent for childvictims is not enough. 110 Victims of abuse in the home should not give up
their ability to corroborate their abuse because their abusers’ privacy interests
outweigh their safety.
Anna, our hypothetical character we met earlier, in the introduction of
this comment, is in a situation almost exactly like the victim in McDade,
except because Anna is an adult victim of physical abuse, rather than a child
victim of sexual abuse, the Legislature has determined that her abuser’s
privacy outranks her ability to achieve justice. 111
Anna’s story is not rare. And it mirrors a recent case in the news: the
story of Neha Rastogi. 112 The only difference, however, is that Rastogi was
not burdened by an all-party consent requirement. A Silicon-Valley-based
Apple employee, Rastogi found herself in a relationship filled with violent
abuse. 113 Her husband beat her regularly throughout their ten years of
marriage. 114 He said he wished to see her murdered, that he imagined her
being stabbed to death. Rastogi secretly recorded multiple instances of threats
and abuse and turned the recordings over to law enforcement, resulting in her
husband’s prosecution. 115 One video recorded the couple arguing and the
repeated sounds of Rastogi’s husband beating her in the presence of their
two-year-old child. 116
Because she did not live in Florida, Rastogi’s video recording was
admissible in court. But in Florida, she would not have been so lucky. Not
only would the recording have been inadmissible as evidence in court, but
Rastogi would have been subject to criminal liability. And in a further act of
manipulation, Rastogi’s husband could have sued her for violating his
privacy. Women like Neha Rastogi should not fear criminal action for
recording the abuse they endure on a daily basis.

109

§ 934.03(2)(k); see also H.R. 7001, 2015 Leg. (Fla. 2015).

110

See David K. Warren, supra note 45, at 251–52.

111

See id. at 250; see also JUDICIARY COMMITTEE , POST-M EETING STAFF ANALYSIS, H.R. 2015,
1 (Fla. 2015), https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2015/7001/Analyses/h7001a.JDC.PDF.
112 Michael Daly, Silicon Valley CEO Pleads ‘No Contest’ to Abusing His Wife—and Is Offered
a Deal for Less than 30 Days in Jail, DAILY BEAST, https://www.thedailybeast.com/silicon-valley-ceopleads-no-contest-to-abusing-his-wifeand-is-offered-a-deal-for-less-than-30-days-in-jail (May 5, 2017,
2:30 PM).
113

Id.

114

Id.

115

Id.

116

Id.
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b. Victims of Other Crimes
Although domestic violence victims are most impacted by the
application of Chapter 934, the application of the statute results in the
suppression of evidence of other serious crimes, including extortion and
murder. In State v. Walls, a victim of extortion recorded, in his own home, a
conversation between him and his alleged extortioners. 117 The extortioners
made incriminating statements, which were caught on the recording. 118 The
Florida Supreme Court held that the recordings were wrongfully intercepted
in violation of Chapter 934 and were correctly suppressed by the trial court. 119
To be clear, the victim, in his own home, surreptitiously recorded the
statements, but was barred from using them to prove the misconduct. 120
In Smith v. State, a mother, using a call-recording application on her
phone, recorded a conversation between herself and the alleged killer of her
twenty-month-old child. 121 In the recorded conversation, the defendant told
the mother the child was not waking up. 122 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
held that the trial court erred in admitting the recording because the
surreptitious recording of the phone call violated Chapter 934. 123
The limited privacy interests in recording a conversation should not
outweigh the probative value of evidence of criminal conduct resulting from
these interceptions. And victims of crime should not be subject to suit by the
perpetrator, nor should they themselves be charged with a felony for simply
trying to achieve justice.
2. The Justice System Generally
Florida’s justice system, criminal and civil, suffers as a whole from the
all-party consent requirement. The Florida legislature states that the purpose
of the Chapter is “to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral
communications, [and] to protect the integrity of court and administrative
proceedings . . . .”124 But Chapter 934 does not achieve its stated purpose.
Probative, relevant evidence is suppressed, resulting in unjust outcomes in
both the criminal and civil spheres.

117

State v. Walls, 356 So. 2d 294, 295 (Fla. 1978).

118

Id.

119

Id. at 296.

120

Id.

121

Smith v. State, 261 So. 3d 714, 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018).

122

See id.

123

Id. at 716.

124

FLA. STAT. § 934.01(2) (2020).
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3. Technology
We live in an era of rapid technological advancement. Home
surveillance systems are affordable and readily available. 125 Many doorbells
are equipped with a camera linked to the homeowner’s smartphone. 126
Eyeglasses record video. 127 People utilize high-tech recording devices,
including Go-Pros128 and selfie-sticks, 129 to record vacation memories,
parties, and outdoor activities. Cellphones, which function as cameras, voice
recorders, and mini-computers, are almost an extension of a person’s body. 130
We live in an age where the recording of activity is commonplace to save
happy memories, for security purposes, and to make life easier. Taking
videos and posting to Facebook, Snapchat, and Instagram is a daily ritual for
many. 131 Because of this shift in societal norms, Chapter 934’s bar against
surreptitious recording stifles social exchange, fails to achieve its desired
purpose, and raises the very real risk of criminalizing commonplace
conduct. 132
The application of the all-party consent requirement to situations
involving advanced technology is unclear. 133 Courts have not yet tested the
boundaries of the law. Due to the reasonable expectation of privacy
requirement, most recorded conversations will not fall under the purview of
Chapter 934. 134 But many will. And as technology advances, the law must
also advance.
a. Social Exchange
All-party consent statutes are hampering the very thing they seek to
promote: social exchange. 135 Major shifts in technology have led to the rapid
125 Complete Surveillance Systems, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Complete-SurveillanceSystems/b?ie=UTF8&node=898406 (last visited Nov. 18, 2020).
126

RING, https://ring.com (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).

127

Glass, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/glass/start/ (last visited
SPECTACLES, https://www.spectacles.com/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2020).
128

Nov. 15, 2020);

GOPRO, https://gopro.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2020).

129

David Beren, The 5 Best Selfie Sticks of 2020, LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/best-selfiesticks-4048577 (last updates Jan. 7, 2021).
130 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373,
393–394 (2014).
131 Brian Peters, We Analyzed 15,000 Instagram Stories from 200 of the World ’s Top Brands (New
Stories Research), BUFFER (Nov. 8, 2018), https://blog.bufferapp.com/instagram -stories-research.
132

Johl, supra note 45, at 177–78.

133

See id.

134

See id.

135

See id.
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integration of technology with social interaction. Millennials are mocked for
always being on their phones, 136 but the stereotype signals how intertwined
technology is with the daily lives of the current generation, and it
foreshadows the behavior of future generations. Technology is not just a tool;
it has become an important part of human interaction.
Chapter 934 does not encourage social exchange but undermines it. 137
As discussed above, states that impose all-party consent requirements
articulate a common purpose: to encourage vital social exchange and ensure
that people do not live in fear of eavesdropping. 138 As technology use has
increased, the statute no longer furthers its purpose. People are intentionally
recording their lives, including their conversations. 139 Innocent use of
commonplace technology can quickly evolve into a felony conviction or civil
suit by an irate recordee. And because there is a lack of clarity in the
boundaries of the law, there is a chilling effect on the use of these new
technology types, technology that promotes human communication. Allparty consent laws hamper social interaction.
And single-party consent jurisdictions still achieve what all-party
consent jurisdictions state as their purpose. Eavesdropping, listening in on a
conversation one is not a party to, is always illegal. Free, robust
communication is not stifled in single-party consent jurisdictions. Singleparty consent jurisdictions just accept that when someone conveys
information to another, that person may not always keep the information
private. That fear is no more real and palpable in single-party consent than it
is in all-party consent jurisdictions. The law does not further its purpose.
b. Criminalizing Commonplace Conduct
It is also likely that Chapter 934 criminalizes commonplace conduct. If
a person has in-home security cameras that record audio, or a nanny-cam,
and that device records a conversation, Chapter 934 is implicated. Wearing
Google Glass or Snapchat Spectacles to “capture your world, the way you

136 See Catey Hill, Millennials Engage with Their Smartphones More than They Do Actual
Humans, M ARKETWATCH (June 21, 2016, 6:01 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/millennialsengage-with-their-smartphones-more-than-they-do-actual-humans-2016-06-21.
137 Aatif Sulleyman, Millennials and Generation Z Interact More Through Phones and Apps than
in Real Life, Report Finds, I NDEPENDENT (Oct. 19, 2017, 12:06 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/lifestyle/gadgets-and-tech/news/millennials-generation-z-smartphone-habits-apps-communications-reallife-a8008641.html.
138
139

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 970 (Mass. 2001).

Sulleyman, supra note 137; Enrique Dans, The Internet of the Ephemeral, FORBES (Aug. 8,
2016,
12:22
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/enriquedans/2016/08/08/the-internet-of-theephemeral/#5575413e22fb.
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see it”140 or even so much as recording a video with your iPhone for your
Instagram Story141 could fall within the purview of Chapter 934. 142 An
obvious limit exists, however, because of the reasonable expectation of
privacy requirement. When these recordings are taken in public places, at a
large party, or in a busy restaurant, it seems fairly straightforward that a
person would not exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
communication. As explained by McDade, the home is one place, almost
certainly, where a person exhibits a reasonable expectation of privacy. 143 But
because of the context-specific nature of the reasonable expectation of
privacy inquiry, there is a lingering question of whether a conversation in an
automobile, in a secluded public area, in a dark corner of a restaurant, in a
backyard, or in a business meeting could implicate the statute.
The problem is in these grey areas. The example of Ivan, the ridesharing
driver we met in the introduction of this comment, illustrates one of these
grey areas. A vehicle passenger obviously exhibits reduced privacy interests
as opposed to someone in a home. 144 But it is unclear whether Ivan would
have violated the statute if he recorded communications with passengers.
The aforementioned new, evolving technologies are rapidly increasing
in use. 145 Thus, with the increased use of recording technology, more people
will be intentionally, surreptitiously recording conversations, and thus
unintentionally violating the statute. 146
4. Exposing Misconduct
People employ recording devices to promote important societal
interests. Security cameras are everywhere. When an exciting event occurs,
people quickly whip out their smartphones to capture it on video. 147 And
140

Glass, X, https://www.x.company/glass/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2019); SPECTACLES, supra note

127.
141 Instagram Stories are a feature on the popular app Instagram. The Stories feature allows users
to upload photos or short videos to their “story,” which disappears every 24 hours. Many other social
media applications have utilized similar features, with Snapchat being the first to implement this type of
photo and video sharing. For information on how the Stories feature works, see Alina Bradford, Everything
You Need to Master Instagram Stories, CNET (Apr. 24, 2018, 8:19 AM), https://www.cnet.com/howto/how-to-use-instagram-stories/.
142

FLA. STAT. § 934.03 (2020).

143

See McDade v. State, 154 So. 3d 292, 299 (Fla. 2014).

144

See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148–49 (1978).

145

Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 12, 2019), http://www.pewinternet.org/factsheet/mobile/.
146
147

Johl, supra note 45, at 189.

See Jesse Harlan Alderman, Police Privacy in the iPhone Era?: The Need for Safeguards in
State Wiretapping Statutes to Preserve the Civilian’s Right to Record Public Police Activity, 9 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 487, 488 (2011).
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when something bad is afoot, people turn to those same recording devices to
capture evidence of the misconduct. Florida’s ban on surreptitious recording
stifles social mechanisms for shining light on improper behavior.
Surreptitious recording has beneficial value beyond crime-fighting and
evidence gathering. Surreptitious recordings can reveal employee
misconduct, political malfeasance, bullying, racism, or unethical business
dealings. As Justice Brandeis famously said before beginning his tenure on
the Court: “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric
light the most efficient policeman.”148 Surreptitious recording encourages the
use of modern technology to uncover nefarious behavior and promote social
change.
Nationally, the recording of government officials in all-party consent
jurisdictions has resulted in criminal charges for many. And these stories did
not occur in Florida; they very well could have. In most states, the laws are
verbatim the same as Chapter 934. In February 2019, a university student
who livestreamed a meeting with his congressman was charged with two
felony counts of wiretapping. 149 In 2017, a woman looking for her daughter
at her daughter’s school recorded her conversation with the school principal
and was later charged with a felony. 150 When a concerned father met with a
school principal to inquire about whether his daughter was being bullied, he
recorded the meeting. 151 Soon after, he was charged with a felony. 152 In 2015,
when a whistleblower secretly recorded his phone conversation with his
superior to catch him admitting to ethics violations, the local district attorney
charged him with a felony. 153 A scared and humiliated special needs student
secretly recorded a bully tormenting him, and he was arrested for violating
the state’s anti-wiretap laws. 154 A taxicab authority officer recorded a phone
148

LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S M ONEY AND H OW BANKERS USE I T 92 (1914).

149

Sarah Ash, SU Student Facing Felony Charges for Wire Tapping , WMDT (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://www.wmdt.com/2019/02/su-student-facing-felony-charges-for-wire-tapping/.
150 Barry Simms, Mom Faces Felony Wiretapping Charges After Recording Conversation with
Principal, WBALTV (Dec. 7, 2017, 10:42 AM), https://www.wbaltv.com/article/mom -faces-felonywiretapping-charges-after-recording-conversation-with-principal/14378453.
151 Pa’s Wiretapping Law is Too Restrictive, YORK DAILY REC. (Aug. 22, 2016, 9:27 AM),
https://www.ydr.com/story/opinion/editorials/2016/08/22/pas-wiretapping-law-too-restrictiveeditorial/88997020/.
152

Id.

153

Rick Lee, Judge Orders Wiretapping Charge Dismissed Against Unilife Whistle-Blower,
YORK DAILY REC. (July 8, 2015, 8:30 PM), https://www.ydr.com/story/news/local/2015/07/08/judgeorders-wiretapping-charge-dismissed-against-unilifewhistle/72247922/?from=global&sessionKey=&autologin=.
154 Patrick Frye, Disabled Boy Records Bullies Tormenting Him, Police Charge Him with Illegal
Wiretapping, I NQUISITR (Apr. 12, 2014), https://www.inquisitr.com/1209361/disabled -boy-recordsbullies-tormenting-him-police-charge-him-with-illegal-wiretapping/.
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conversation with the chief of the taxi authority to expose rampant taxicab
overcharging schemes and was charged with a felony when the tape leaked. 155
Some record conversations as a protective measure against wrongdoing,
even though no wrongdoing results, and are punished as a result. In 2018, a
thirteen-year-old boy who recorded a conversation with his principal was
charged with a felony under an all-party consent statute. 156 In January 2019,
a man surreptitiously recorded his neighbor to prove a point in a property line
dispute. After the civil case ended, his neighbor pressed criminal charges for
the secret recording. 157
Each of these cases resulted in various outcomes. Some were dismissed
as a result of public outcry, some resulted in guilty pleas to lower charges,
some were dismissed on other grounds, and some resulted in a felony
conviction. Even when the ultimate result is not a conviction, though, the use
of the wiretapping laws as a sword to stifle whistleblowers, concerned
parents, and cautious students is simply wrong. Further, each of the charged
individuals carries a stain on their reputation. A quick search of their names
reveals a news article touting a felony charge. In a single-party consent state,
they would be praised as heroes if the recording resulted in the exposure of
wrongdoing. These stories are real-world examples of what happens in allparty consent jurisdictions.
a. Private Misconduct
Surreptitious recordings have resulted in several newsworthy events.
Just in the past year, a Georgia woman captured her neurologist touching her
inappropriately without her consent, 158 a woman recorded a police officer
coercing her into sexual favors, 159 and a secret recording of business meeting

155 George Knapp, I-Team: Taxicab Investigator Found Not Guilty in Wiretapping Case,
8NEWSNOW,
https://www.lasvegasnow.com/news/i-team-taxicab-investigator-found-not-guilty-inwiretapping-case/1301437520 (last updated July 13, 2018, 8:21 PM).
156 Austin Berg, Illinois 13-Year-Old Charged with Eavesdropping Felony for Recording Meeting
with Principal, I LL. POLICY (June 21, 2018), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/illinois -13-year-old-charged with-eavesdropping-felony-for-recording-meeting-with-principal/.
157 Samantha McDaniel-Ogletree, Charge Says Man Violated Eavesdropping Law by Recording
Conversation with
Neighbor, M YJOURNALCOURIER (Jan.
27,
2019,
4:56
AM),
https://www.myjournalcourier.com/news/article/Charge-says-man-violated-eavesdropping-law-by13565066.php.
158 Danny Robbins, He Was Caught on Video, but Georgia Doctor Kept His Medical License,
AJC (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/caught_on_video_but_kept_georgia_medical_license/.
159 Randy Travis, Secret Recording Catches Deputy in Blackmail, Request for Sexual Favors, FOX
5 ATL. (Aug. 30, 2018, 3:54 PM), http://www.fox5atlanta.com/news/i-team/secret-recording-catchesdeputy-in-blackmail-request-for-sexual-favors.
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discussions revealed improper influence in an energy deal. 160 In 2016, a
woman secretly recorded her conversations with a medical examiner. 161 Her
recordings ultimately uncovered a flawed death investigation and highlighted
the need for oversight in that office. 162 Secret recordings have also resulted
in the successful settlement of an estate 163 and exposure of employee
misconduct. 164 Notably, the famous Halliburton whistleblower, Tony
Menendez, who exposed the energy industry behemoth’s SEC rule
violations, gathered evidence by secretly taping company meetings. 165 These
people are met with congratulations and news interviews, while their allparty consent jurisdiction resident counterparts are met with felony charges.
b. Government Misconduct and Recording Police
Recording of government officials does not result in improved outcomes
for those in all-party consent jurisdictions. In February 2019, a university
student who livestreamed a meeting with his congressman was charged with
two felony counts of wiretapping. 166
There is also an important concern with recording police officers. In
light of recent changes in social attitudes towards police conduct, one of the
first responses to a police-citizen interaction is to record it. These recordings
have resulted in the exposure of police misconduct but have also exonerated
police from accusations of wrongful behavior. At the moment, some police
officers respond to being recorded by arresting the individual. Many Circuits
have held that, under the First Amendment, there is a right to record police
officers in public. 167

160 Tux Turkel, Secret Recordings Point to Improper Influence by Top UMaine Official in
Lucrative
Power
Contract,
PORTLAND
PRESS
H ERALD,
https://www.pressherald.com/2018/02/04/recordings-point-to-improper-influence-by-top-umaine-execin-lucrative-power-contract/ (last updated Feb. 5, 2018).
161 Secret Recordings Reveal Flawed Death Investigation , FOX 9 KMSP (Nov. 16, 2016, 3:53
PM), http://www.fox9.com/news/investigators/secret-recordings-reveal-flawed-death-investigation.
162

Id.

163

David Kravets, Court OKs Covert iPhone Audio Recording, WIRED (Aug. 18, 2010, 4:37 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2010/08/covert-iphone-audio-recording/.
164

See Johl, supra note 45, at 200.

165

Jesse Eisinger, The Man Who Blew the Whistle on Halliburton, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 23, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/the-man-who-blew-the-whistle-onhalliburton/391215/.
166

Ash, supra note 149.

See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that “[b]asic First
Amendment principles, along with case law from this and other circuits” acknowledge a constitutionally
protected right to videotape police carrying out their duties in public); see also Fields v. City of
Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding there is a First Amendment right to record law
enforcement in public subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions); Turner v. Driver, 848
167
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In the background of each of these cases are state wiretap laws. 168 Most
wiretap laws are not implicated because the officers do not exhibit a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their communications—because the
recorded actions are taking place in public. 169 But the Circuits have only
recognized a right to record law enforcement officers in contexts where an
officer has no reasonable expectation of privacy and have not answered the
question in the context of more private communication, such as during a
traffic stop170 or in an office meeting. 171 Thus, the intersection between
wiretap laws and the right to record police acting in their public duties only
creates an issue if police officers possess a reasonable expectation of privacy
while acting in their law enforcement duties. 172
Prosecution for secretly recording law enforcement is not a hypothetical
matter. Tiawanda Moore used her cellphone to record a conversation with an
Internal Affairs officer regarding her complaint against a police officer
accused of groping Ms. Moore. 173 She was charged with eavesdropping and
spent two weeks in jail, although the charges were later dropped. 174 In
Commonwealth v. Hyde, the defendant was not as lucky as Ms. Moore. 175
After using a camcorder to record a traffic stop because he sought to file a
police harassment complaint, Mr. Hyde was charged under eavesdropping
F.3d 678, 689 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding there is a First Amendment right to record police and notin g that
“[f]ilming the police contributes to the public’s ability to hold the police accountable, ensure that police
officers are not abusing their power, and make informed decisions about police policy ” in addition to
helping law enforcement); ACLU v. Alva rez, 679 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2012) (granting a preliminary
injunction against the Illinois State Attorney enjoining enforcement of Illinois’ wiretap law against the
ACLU in the context of openly recording police officers’ oral communications in public places); Fordyce
v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding a citizen had a “First Amendment right to
film matters of public interest” when the citizen videotaped and audio recorded police officers at a public
protest); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding there is a First
Amendment right to videotape police activities because “[t]he First Amendment protects the right to
gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record
matters of public interest.”); Akins v. Knight, 863 F.3d 1084, 1087 (8th Cir. 2017) (affirming a district
court’s finding that there is a First Amendment right to audio or video record a public official in public);
cf. Sandberg v. Englewood, 727 F. App’x 950, 963 (10th Cir. 2018).
168

See, e.g., Alderman, supra note 147, at 488.

169

Bast, supra note 40, at 862.

170

Cf. Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 964 (Mass. 2001) (holding a secret recording
taken during a traffic stop of statements made by police officers violated state wiretap statute).
171 Cf. United States v. McIntyre, 582 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 1978) (suppressing audio recorded
evidence collected from a bug placed in a police officer’s office via a briefcase because the officer
exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy in the communications uttered in his office, rendering the
recorded utterances an “oral communication” under 28 U.S.C. § 2511).
172

See, e.g., Alderman, supra note 147, at 494.

173

Justin Welply, When, Where and Why the First Amendment Protects the Right to Record Police
Communications: A Substantial Interference Guideline for Determining the Scope of the Right to Record
and for Revamping Restrictive State Wiretapping Laws, 57 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 1085, 1085–86 (2013).
174

See, e.g., id.

175

Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 965–66.
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laws, convicted, and his conviction was upheld by the state’s highest court.176
In both Illinois and Massachusetts, where these situations occurred, the
eavesdropping statutes do not contain a reasonable expectation of privacy
provision, so recording a conversation without the consent of all parties
violates the statute even if the conversation takes place at a high volume in a
public place. 177
Even in states with reasonable expectation of privacy requirements,
though, prosecution under wiretap laws occurs. 178 In McDonough v.
Fernandez-Rundle, McDonough secretly recorded his meeting with the
Homestead Chief of Police, which took place in the Chief’s office with a
friend of McDonough’s and a detective. 179 After a dispute ensued regarding
what was said at the meeting, McDonough published portions of the
recording on YouTube to confirm his account of the events. Miami-Dade
State Attorney Fernandez-Rundle sent McDonough a letter containing a
threat of felony arrest and prosecution under section 934.03. The Eleventh
Circuit disposed of the case without deciding any constitutional issues and
held that the speakers did not exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy
given the facts of the situation.
There is an unanswered question, however: is there a circumstance
where police officers, acting in their job function, can exhibit a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a communication with a citizen? There may be
narrow situations where officers acting in their public duties do exhibit a
reasonable expectation of privacy, such as during a private interview between
a single officer and an individual in a private setting, as contrasted with the
public circumstances in the McDonough case. 180 Given Florida’s approach
with the home, a police interview in a private residence would likely fall
under Chapter 934.
Further, it was important to the court in McDonough that the Chief did
not set ground rules for the meeting and did not provide any notice that
established an expectation of confidentiality. 181 But what if he had? And what
if the meeting was simply between the Chief of Police and McDonough?
Florida has not given us an answer to those questions, but given the current
state of the law, it is not clear. And recording police is an important part of
government accountability.

176

See id. at 966.

177

Welply, supra note 173, at 1085.

178

Andy Hershberger, Man Arrested After Recording Police Awarded $275,000 in Settlement,
WMUR 9, https://www.wmur.com/article/man-arrested-after-recording-police-awarded-dollar275000in-settlement/13979834 (last updated Nov. 29, 2017, 6:27 PM).
179

McDonough v. Fernandez-Rundle, 862 F.3d 1314, 1316 (11th Cir. 2017).

180

See id.

181

Id.
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In single-party consent jurisdictions, recording of police is a non-issue.
If the police are in public, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy.
And if they are in private, one-party consent kicks in, and a person may
record their interaction with the police without fear of prosecution. Whether
or not there is a constitutional right to record police in private settings, society
has an interest in police accountability, and recording police officers while in
execution of their duties prevents abuses of power.
V.

CONCLUSION

While the contours of Chapter 934 are not yet clear, there is no doubt
that statutory violations will increase. The continued rapid growth of
technology will bring with it an increase in recording. With this increase in
recording, people will, without a doubt, violate Chapter 934. Chapter 934
needs to adapt to accommodate these updates in technology. Instead of
criminalizing surreptitious recording, it should be used for beneficial
purposes like protecting victims, promoting truth-finding, using technology,
and exposing misconduct. Single-party consent would provide a solution to
all of the problems discussed in this comment.
A change to single-party consent only has one real effect: it allows
someone already in possession of information they have been consensually
provided with to record that information and serve important societal
interests. 182 Florida needs a major update on its wiretap law, and that update
is single-party consent. Victims need it. Society needs it. The Florida
Legislature needs to make the change.

182

Johl, supra note 45, at 181–82.

